次の文章は、太平洋戦争末期のいわゆるヤルタ会談(第二次世界大戦終結を見越して
その戦後処理の基本方針を討議決定した米英ソ首脳会談)前後においてソ連の対日参
戦に至る外交経緯を、交渉理論(戦略と戦術)から分析したものである。文章を精読し
以下の質問に答えて下さい。
HOW THE PARTIES COME TO TERMS
Fred Charles Iklè, How nations negotiate, Harper and Row, 1963, pp.203-204 より
Firmness can also be expressed by telling your opponent that you are
[ (1) ] eager to reach agreement, so that he will think he has to meet your terms to
make agreement worthwhile for you. Up to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima,
the United States was anxious to obtain Soviet participation in defeating
Japan. This wish resulted from faulty intelligence about Japan's military
strength, ignoring of Japanese peace feelers, and the unimaginative
insistence on "unconditional surrender." But these errors are not the
ones that concern us here.
American diplomacy committed another error in negotiating with Stalin for
Soviet entry into the war against Japan―regardless of whether or not Soviet
participation was necessary for a quick victory. This was the American
belief that Stalin was not eager to come into the war and hence would do so
only if rewarded by territorial gains. Foreign Secretary Eden, for one, did
not share this view, as he explained to Secretary of State Stettinius when
they met at Malta to prepare for the Yalta Conference (where Stalin was
promised his reward for entering the war against Japan). According to the
minutes of the Malta meeting, Eden told Stettinius: "... if the Russians
decided to enter the war against Japan they would take the decision because
they considered it in their interests that the Japanese war should not be
successfully finished by the U.S. and Great Britain alone. There was
therefore no need for us to offer a high price for their participation, and
if we were prepared to agree to their territorial demands in the Far East we
should see to it that we obtained a good return in respect of the points on
which we required concessions from them."
At Yalta, Stalin skillfully(*) avoided giving any support to Eden's
thesis that it was in Russia's own interest to enter the war against Japan.
He argued that if his demands in the Far East were not met, "it would be
difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was
entering the war against Japan...; however, if these political conditions
were met, the people would understand the national interest involved and it
would be very much easier to explain the decision to a Supreme Soviet." And
when Hopkins came to see him in Moscow a few months later, Stalin, to make
sure that his conditions would be met, again used the argument that he was
[ (2) ] eager to enter the war against Japan.
注）Japanese peace feelers 日本側からの終戦模索の諸工作
Eden, Anthony 英国の政治家、外交官、外相
Stettinius, Edward R 米国の外交官、国務長官
Molotov, Vyacheslav ソ連外務人民委員
Hopkins, Harry 米国の外交官
Supreme Soviet ソ連最高会議
1) 次のどの語句が適当ですか。 (not at all, at least somewhat, very)
2) 次のどの語句が適当ですか。 (not, very, this time)
3) 状況を戦略レベルと戦術レベルに分けなさい。
4) *skillfullyとあるのはなぜですか。